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Abstract
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in both economics and computer science
literature. However, most of the work considers only integral matchings. The study of stable
fractional matchings is fairly recent and moreover, is scarce. This paper reports the first inves-
tigation into the important but unexplored topic of incentive compatibility of matching mecha-
nisms to find stable fractional matchings. We focus our attention on matching instances under
strict preferences. First, we make the significant observation that there are matching instances
for which no mechanism that produces a stable fractional matching is incentive compatible. We
then characterize restricted settings of matching instances admitting unique stable fractional
matchings. Specifically, we show that there will exist a unique stable fractional matching for a
matching instance if and only if the given matching instance satisfies what we call the condi-
tional mutual first preference property (CMFP). For this class of instances, we prove that every
mechanism that produces the unique stable fractional matching is (a) incentive compatible and
(b) resistant to coalitional manipulations. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute
the stable fractional matching as well. The algorithm uses envy-graphs, hitherto unused in the
study of stable matchings.
1 Introduction
Matchings have been studied for several decades now, beginning with Gale and Shapley’s pioneer-
ing work [GS62]. They introduced the notion of stability and provided algorithms for finding stable
matchings. Since then, a considerable amount of work has been carried out on both the theory and
applications of stable matchings. Matching mechanisms already in use have also been for their sta-
bility and incentive compatibility aspects [CEE+19, BCC+19, GKNR19]. The focus of these studies
has often been school choice mechanisms or residency matching mechanisms already in practice
[APR09, APRS05].
In these familiar settings, nodes are wholly or “integrally” matched. We shall call such match-
ings as integral matchings. A fractional matchings is essentially a convex combinations of integral
matchings. While they do have a lot of practical relevance, fractional matchings are not relevant
for settings such as school choice. Consequently, they have only been studied in literature as a
means to produce integral matchings. Even papers that explicitly study fractional allocations only
use them towards a deeper understanding of integral matchings [RRVV93, TS98, STQ06].
1.1 Fractional Matchings
There are many practical situations where fractional matchings are relevant. Consider for instance,
labour markets. Here freelancing experts or professionals can spend different fractions of their
time working for various organizations. Labour markets have been mentioned in Caragiannis et
al. [CFRKV19], who were the first to study the stability of fractional matchings. Another relevant
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application would be markets for cloud space where it is not necessary for data to be stored entirely
on one server.
Fractional allocations are also relevant for settings where matchings must be done repeatedly.
An excellent example comes from the chore division setting. Consider a house shared by multiple
people. There are various tasks or chores that must be done around the house. Each person does
each task differently and as a consequence generates a different value by performing the task.
However each person may not take an equal amount of time or energy when performing a given
task. As a result, a person incurs a cost for performing each task. Further, these tasks must be done
repeatedly over time and it is perfectly fine for different agents to do a particular task at different
times. Consequently, we require a fractional matching that indicates the fractions of times agents
perform each task.
Stability is a crucial requirement for fractional matchings as well. For instance, in the chore di-
vision setting, it is not desirable to have a division of tasks where there is a person who would incur
less cost by always doing another activity and would do it better. Exploring fractional matchings
from contexts studied for integral matchings can raise interesting challenges.
Relaxing the integrality constraint in matchings may make the problem harder. For instance,
the problem of finding a stable, social welfare maximizing integral matching can be posed as a
linear program. However, when we allow for matchings to be fractional, the problem becomes
NP-Hard. This was shown by Caragiannis et al. [CFRKV19]. They also show that by allowing the
stable matchings to be fractional, we can make large gains in terms of social welfare. Thus, it is
of interest to study fractional matchings and design algorithms to find fractional matchings with
desirable properties.
Another crucial requirement for matching mechanisms is incentive compatibility, i.e. the match-
ing mechanism should induce all participating agents to reveal their true preferences. This paper
explores the problem of finding incentive compatible mechanisms that produce stable fractional
matchings.
1.2 Our Contributions
We focus our study on matching settings where all agents provide their preferences in the form
of cardinal valuations. Further, each agent’s valuations are assumed to imply a strict (preference)
order of the agents on the other side. We will be defining these terms more formally in Section
3.1. A review of relevant work is presented in Section 2. Section 3.2 provides relevant structural
observations on the space of stable fractional matchings. These observations bring out several
hurdles to the design of algorithms to find stable fractional matchings which are not integral.
The contribution of this paper is in the important but unexplored topic of incentive compatibility
of matching mechanisms to find stable fractional matchings. We focus on matching instances under
strict preferences.
• First, in Section 4, we make the significant observation that there are matching instances for
which no mechanism that produces a stable fractional matching is incentive compatible.
• We then characterize, in Section 4.2, restricted settings of matching instances that admit
unique stable fractional matchings. Specifically, we show that there will exist a unique sta-
ble fractional matching if and only if the given matching instance satisfies what we call the
conditioned mutual first preference property (CMFP).
• When the input is restricted to the above class of instances, every mechanism that produces
the unique stable fractional matching will be incentive compatible. Furthermore, the output
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of this mechanism is resistant to coalitional manipulations for the above setting.
• We next provide, in Section 4.3, the first algorithm to compute stable fractional matchings
which are not integral. Our polynomial-time algorithm makes intelligent use of envy-graphs,
hitherto unused in the stable matchings literature.
2 Relevant Work
Work in the study of matchings began with Gale and Shapley’s seminal work [GS62]. They con-
sidered a setting with n men and n women where each woman had preference list over the set of
all men and vice versa. They defined the notion of stability and showed that in the stable mar-
riage problem, a stable matching always exists. Our work also considers the same setting, with
the restriction that the preferences are available in cardinal form. Gale and Shapley’s original pa-
per initiated decades of work into the rich field of matchings, studying various aspects of stable
matchings in particular. Roth established that no stable (integral) matching mechanism is incentive
compatible for all agents [Rot82]. He showed however that the Gale Shapley algorithm is opti-
mal and incentive compatible for the proposing side. Kojima and Pathak [KP09] studied incentive
compatibility of the college admissions problem. They gave regularity conditions under which the
fraction of the population with an incentive to lie goes to 0.
A part of the matchings literature is devoted to the manipulation of the mechanism given by
Gale and Shapley. Teo et al. [TST01] gave a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal
manipulation of each woman. Here the underlying mechanism implements the Gale Shapley algo-
rithm with men proposing. Vaish and Garg [VG17] show that the matching returned by the Gale
Shapley algorithm on the optimal manipulation is also stable under the true preferences. They
further show that for each woman there is an optimal inconspicuous manipulation1. Further, the
lattice of stable matchings under this manipulation is contained in the lattice of stable matchings
on the true preferences. Shen et al. [STD18] give a polynomial-time algorithm for each coalition
to find their optimal manipulation. They further show that any such manipulation can be made
inconspicuous.
Gale and Shapley’s work while having profound consequences gave no intuition into the struc-
ture of the space of stable matchings. As a result, much of the initial work on matchings tried to
explore this. Work by Roth et al. [RRVV93] and Teo and Sethuraman [TS98] used linear program-
ming formulations to capture and analyze the stable marriage problem. With linear programming
formulations, fractional matchings also become an important part of the analysis. Both establish
the integrality of the polytope. The fractional allocations studied in both papers are said to be
stable if the closest integral matching is stable. In general, in the majority of literature a fractional
matching is said to be stable if the matchings in its support are stable. Most matching algorithms
which find fractional matchings use them to round to an integral matching.
An important setback in the initial analysis of fractional matchings was that the preferences
available are ordinal and not cardinal2. Consequently, there was no non-trivial way to define the
stability of a fractional matching. Note that, a fractional matching is a convex combination of
integral matchings. Caragiannis et al. [CFRKV19] overcome this by considering a stable matching
setting where cardinal valuations are available. Thus, it is now possible to analyse the social
welfare. In many instances fractional matchings are able achieve much higher social welfare as
1An inconspicuous manipulation is one where the position of exactly one agent is changed in the preference list.
2That is, agents’ preferences were given in the form of preference lists and not numeric values.
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compared to integral matchings. Consequently, they aim to find a stable fractional matching which
maximizes social welfare. They call this problem as SMC.
The authors give a series of structural inferences about the space of stable fractional matchings,
some algorithmic results and finally concluding by showing hardness of approximation for SMC.
An important observation is that the space of stable fractional matchings is not convex. The authors
show a simple example where the convex combinations of two stable integral matchings is not
stable3. It is relevant to note that Caragiannis et al., in fact, do not give an algorithm to find
a stable fractional matching which is not integral, whenever one exists, irrespective of the social
welfare.
Our work addresses this notable gap. We design a polynomial-time algorithm to find a stable
fractional matching, which is not integral, whenever one exists, under strict preference orders.
This condition, while being realistic and only mildly restrictive for practical purposes, is critical to
our construction. This in turn also helps us characterize the instances for whom a unique stable
fractional matching exists.
Envy-graphs are essential to our analysis and had previously been used largely only in work on
fair division [CEM07, CKMS19]. Envy is defined very differently in matching settings. “Justified”
envy has been studied for the many-to-one matching setting, such as that of school choice, and
is a relaxation of stability in these settings [WR18, AK19]. Other notions of fairness have also
been studied for various matching applications [AGSW19, HKMM16, NV17]. Some work has also
been done in designing incentive compatible mechanisms for finding fair matchings in constrained
settings [YZBY18, ZYBY18]. However, the notions of fairness studied here are not the same as
those studied in fair division literature. This is largely because fair division settings assume cardinal
valuations. In contrast, traditional matching settings assume ordinal valuations.
3 Preliminaries
Having laid out the positioning of our work, we now discuss relevant preliminaries for our analy-
sis. We shall refer to an instance of our problem of finding stable fractional matching as a stable
matchings instance.
3.1 Definitions
We represent a stable matching instance as I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉. Here, M = {m1, · · · , mn} is the
set of men and W = {w1, · · · , wn}, is the set of women. The valuations of men and women are
captured by matrices U = [ai,j ]i,j∈[n] and V = [bi,j ]i,j∈[n] respectively. In particular, ai,j is mi’s
valuation for being matched integrally to wj . Analogously, bi,j is wj ’s valuation for being matched
integrally to mi. We assume that all entries of U and V are non-negative and that a linear order
can be derived from the valuations of one agent. That is, for each man m ∈ there do not exist two
distinct women w,w′ such that U(m,w) = U(m,w′). Similarly, for each woman w ∈ W there do
not exist two distinct men such that V (m,w) = V (m′, w). We say that such preferences are strict.
Matching problems are traditionally studied as graph problems. Let us denote the induced
bipartite graph for a stable matching instance I as G = (V,E) where V = M ∪W and (mi, wj) /∈
3This further shows that fractional allocations in the stable matchings polytope studied in [RRVV93]and [TS98] need
not in fact be stable themselves. In the followup work in [STQ06] the authors call the fractional allocations fractional
stable matchings indicating that they are not discussing the stability of these fractional matchings but are only interested
in their being the convex combination of stable matchings.
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E ⇔ U(i, j) = V (i, j) = 0. Given v ∈ V, e ∈ E, we shall use e ⊥ v to denote that e is incident on v.
Fractional matchings can be thought of in two equivalent ways.
Definition 1 (Fractional Matching). µ is said to be a fractional matching on G = (V,E) if µ : E →
[0, 1] such that ∀v ∈ V,∑e⊥v µ(e) ≤ 1.
An alternate way of looking at fractional matchings is to think of them as convex combinations
of integral matchings, where integral matchings are defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Integral Matching). Given a graph G = (V,E) µ ⊆ E is said to be an integral
matching if for each v ∈ V there is at most one edge in µ which is incident on v.
By Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, we given a fractional matching as defined in 1, we can
decompose it into a convex combination of O(n2) integral matchings. We will largely consider frac-
tional matchings as defined in Definition 1. Let us clarify some notation with regards to matchings.
For an integral matching µ and a ∈ M ∪W , µ(a) denotes a’s partner under µ. We shall say that
fractional matching µ1 is a subset of µ2, when (i) they are defined for the same instance I and (ii)
for each (m,w) ∈ M ×W such that if µ1((m,w)) > 0, then µ1((m,w)) = µ2((m,w)). Note that it
is necessary for the underlying instance to be the same for this definition to make sense.
Before defining the stability of fractional matchings, we must define a blocking pair in the
context of fractional matchings. We say that (m,w) form a blocking pair under matching µ if both
get strictly less utility from µ than they get by being matched integrally with each other. The utility
of a woman w under fractional matching µ is
∑
m∈M µ((m,w))V (m,w). Thus, it is essentially the
weighted sum of the utility from each of the integral matchings in the support of µ. The utility of a
man can be analogously defined. Hence, we can now define stability for fractional matchings.
Definition 3 (Stable Fractional Matchings). A fractional matching µ is said to be stable is there
does not exist a pair of agents (m,w) ∈ M ×W such that U(m,w) > U(m,µ(m)) and V (m,w) >
V (µ(w), w).
Recall that our model is identical to that of Gale and Shapley with the exception that the pref-
erences are available in cardinal form. As a result, we can always derive an instance of the type
studied by Gale and Shapley given I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉. Consequently, a stable integral matching
always exists. Further, no stable matching will have unmatched agents, as the number of men and
women are equal. Also, it is easy to see that integral matchings that are stable under our definition
are also stable under Gale and Shapley’s original definition. Hence, throughout our analysis, we
will assume these facts, without explicitly stating them.
We explore the existence of incentive compatible mechanisms to find stable fractional match-
ings. This paper aims for what is generally known as Bayesian Incentive Compatibility. That is,
we shall say that a mechanism is incentive compatible if truthful revelation of preferences by all
agents is a Nash Equilibrium for all input instances. We show that there does not exist a mecha-
nism to find a stable fractional matching which is incentive compatible for all agents. This clearly
negates any possibility of a mechanism where truthful revelation is a dominant strategy even for
general settings.
We identify a special class of stable matching instances having a unique stable fractional match-
ing. We show that, in fact, any stable matching instance which has a unique stable fractional
matching belongs to this class. Further, when the input instances are restricted to those that be-
long to this class, we have that any mechanism which finds a stable fractional matching is incentive
compatible. Moreover, when all remaining agents are truthful, no coalition can strategically collude
and misreport their valuations to increase their own utilities. We call this property being resistant
to coalitional manipulations.
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In defining this class we rely heavily on identifying pairs of nodes that satisfy the MFP property.
We call a man woman pair to be MFP (mutual first preference) if they are each others’ first prefer-
ences. That is,m andw are said to be MFP ifw = argmaxa∈W U (t)(m, a), m = argmaxa∈M V (t)(a,w).
Note that for any stable matching instance I with strict preferences, if there exist a pair of nodes
that are MFP, they must be matched under every stable matching.
An important contribution of our work is to give a polynomial-time algorithm to find a stable
fractional matching, which is not integral, whenever one exists. This algorithm is instrumental
in establishing that whenever there are no MFP pairs, under strict preferences, a stable fractional
matching which is not integral can be found. This, in turn, characterizes the instances which have
unique stable fractional matchings. Envy-graphs are critical in establishing these results. Before
defining the construction of an envy-graph, we define envy.
Definition 4 (Envy). Given stable matching instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 and fractional matching µ,
for any w,w′ ∈W , w is said to envy w′ under µ if
vw(µ) =
∑
m∈M
µ((m,w))V (m,w) <
∑
m∈M
µ(m,w′)V (m,w).
Similarly, for any m,m′ ∈M , m is said to envy m′ under µ if
um(µ) =
∑
w∈W
µ((m,w))U(m,w) <
∑
w∈W
µ(m′, w)U(m,w).
For integral matching µ, w envies w′ under µ if V (µ(w), w) < V (µ(w′), w). We can further
define, given a matching, the envy-graph under that matching as follows.
Definition 5 (Envy-graph). Given stable matching instance I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉 and fractional match-
ing µ, the envy-graph on women under µ is a directed graph GW (µ) = (W,E) where (w,w′) ∈
E ⇔ w envies w′ under µ. The envy-graph on men under µ, GM (µ), can be analogously defined.
When there are no MFP agents, we can use envy-graphs to find stable fractional matchings
which are not integral.
3.2 Structural Observations
(a) Non-convexity (b) Unstable Support (c) Unstable Support
Figure 1: Counterexamples
Before we present our analysis, it is important to demonstrate that it is non-trivial to com-
pute stable fractional matchings which are not integral. We now list some structural observations
regarding the space of stable fractional matchings.
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Observation. The convex combination of stable fractional matching need not always be stable.
Caragiannis et al. [CFRKV19] illustrate this with an example which does not have strict pref-
erences.Figure 1a demonstrates that this holds even with strict preferences. There are exactly two
stable integral matchings. These are: µ1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)} and µ2 = {(m1, w2),
(m2, w1), (m3, w3)}. Fractional matching µα = αµ1 + (1 − α)µ2 is not stable for all α ∈ [1/3, 2/3],
as (m3, w2) form a blocking pair. Thus, we have that the space of stable fractional matchings is not
easy to iterate over.
Note that for any instance, stable integral matchings are a subset of stable fractional matchings.
However, knowing the space of stable integral matchings does not give information about the space
of stable fractional matchings. We shall now demonstrate this through two observations.
Observation. A matching instance may have a unique stable integral matching but multiple stable
fractional matchings.
Consider the stable matching instance represented in Figure 1b. The unique stable integral
matching is µ1 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3)}. Consider matching µ2 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2),
(m3, w3)}. Fractional matching µα = αµ1 + (1− α)µ2 is stable for all α ∈ [1/2, 1].
This observation is consequential in conjunction with the observation that there may be stable
fractional matchings with only unstable integral matchings in the support.
Observation. There exist stable fractional matchings whose support consists solely of unstable
integral matchings.
This can be illustrated by the stable matching instance described in Figure 1c. The unique stable
integral matching is µ1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)}. The matchings µ2 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w1)},
µ3 = {(m1, w3), (m2, w1), (m3, w2)} and µ4 = {(m1, w3), (m2, w2), (m3, w1)} are all unstable. How-
ever, the fractional matching µ = µ26 +
µ3
3 +
µ4
2 is in fact stable.
These observations demonstrate that the space of stable fractional matchings can be unintuitive,
even under strict preferences. Finding a stable fractional matching which is not integral is not
straightforward. Given any integral matching, it is not clear how to see whether it is present in the
support of a stable fractional matching. Further, if so, what should be the weight on this matching.
Our analysis of the incentive compatibility of stable fractional matching procedures proposes a way
to overcome these hurdles.
4 Results on Incentive Compatibility
Real-world applications often would want the agents involved to act according to their true pref-
erences. Roth [Rot82] showed that it is not possible to have any incentive compatible mechanism
to find stable integral matchings. However, stable integral matchings form a mere subset of stable
fractional matchings, and it is not explicit whether incentive compatible mechanisms exist in this
case. We now resolve this question by demonstrating that this, in fact, is not possible.
4.1 Impossibility in General Settings
We first consider the algorithm given by Caragiannis et al.[CFRKV19]. The algorithm essentially
proceeds as follows: first find a stable matching, considering only heavy edges4. This matching is
4These are edges where both agents have positive valuations for each other. Edges that are not heavy are said to be
light
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then completed by finding a maximum weight matching for the unmatched agents by only consid-
ering the light edges.
They do not explicitly state the algorithm used to compute stable matchings. However, as a
consequence of [Rot82], the algorithm will be incentive compatible for at most one side. Simple
counterexamples suffice to show that neither of the algorithms are incentive compatible for any set
of agents. Consider the example in Figure 1 where there are two men and two women.
Figure 2: Algorithms in [CFRKV19] are not incentive compatible
Here, there are only two integral matchings possible, both are stable and have the same social
welfare. For this input, the algorithm given may return either of the two integral matchings. In
both the integral matchings only one of the two sides will be happy and the agents on the other
side will benefit by misreporting their preferences. Suppose the matching is {(m1, w1), (m2, w2)}.
If even one of the women reports her value for the man she likes as any value greater than 1, say
α the algorithm will then yield the matching {(m1, w2), (m2, w1)}. For the other matching men can
analogously misreport their preferences.
In fact, we can show that there is no incentive compatible mechanism to find a stable fractional
matching. chooses a value of α ∈ [0, 1] for the matching µα.
(a) true valuations (b) m1 misreports (c) w1 misreports
Figure 3: Counterexample for DSIC mechanism
Theorem 1. There is no incentive compatible mechanism to find stable fractional matchings which
gives incentives for truthful revelation of preferences to all agents on all inputs.
Proof. Consider the stable matching instance described in Figure 3a. There are exactly two stable
integral matching µ1 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3)} and µ2 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3)}.
Further fractional matching µα = αµ1 + (1 − α)µ2 is stable for all α ∈ [0, 1]. No other fractional
matching is stable for this instance. Thus any stable fractional matching algorithm when run on
this instance essentially chooses a value of α ∈ [0, 1] for the matching µα.
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It is easy to see that m1 would like to be matched to w2 integrally, i.e. for the given stable
fractional matching algorithm to choose value α = 1. Let the algorithm choose α = c < 1. m1
can now misreport his preferences as shown in Figure 3b with x ∈ [1, 3). Under this instance, the
only fractional matchings stable are µα for α ∈ [x−12 , 1]. Thus, if a given algorithm to chooses some
α = c < 1, has an incentive to misreport his preferences as shown in Figure 2b with x > 2c + 1,
giving him strictly higher utility. Similarly, w1 would like to be matched integrally to m1. Thus, she
can misreport her preferences as in Figure 3c to ensure that she receives higher utility whenever
the algorithm chooses a value of α > 0.
Thus no mechanism resulting in a stable fractional matching can be incentive compatible for all
the agents when there are no restrictions on the input instances.
4.2 Incentive Compatibility under Restricted Settings
We know from Roth [Rot82] that there is no incentive compatible mechanism for finding stable
integral matchings in general. However, when there is a unique stable integral matching we have
an exception. Under the mechanism implementing the Gale Shapley algorithm, truthful revelation
of preferences by all agents forms a Nash equilibrium. This is a simple consequence of prior work.
Roth [Rot82] showed that when the Gale Shapley algorithm is run with men as proposers, it is a
dominant strategy for men to be honest. By [TST01] women can find their optimal manipulation
for a given instance in polynomial-time. This optimal manipulation matches her with her best
possible partner under Gale Shapley, when men propose. Vaish and Garg [VG17] show that the
resultant matching is also stable under the true preferences. Thus, each woman’s partner, even
after the optimal manipulation, will remain the same.
This motivates us to look at the class of instances where there is a unique stable fractional
matching and see if there are incentive compatible mechanisms for this class. While there has been
much work on finding stable integral matchings, so far there is no work which aims at finding a
stable matching which is not integral. For some instances, such a matching need not exist. Previous
work establishes that there is always a stable integral matching, and thus one stable fractional
matching always exists. It is of interest to have an algorithm, which when given a stable matching
instance, finds a stable fractional matching which is not integral whenever one exists. To this
end, we first try to categorize the class of instances where there exists a unique stable fractional
matching. Note that there is a unique stable fractional matching in the following settings.
Consider the idealistic “soulmate” setting where if man m’s first preference is w, then w’s first
preference is m. Recall that we call such pairs of nodes as MFP pairs (mutual first preference).
Here it is easy to see that the unique stable matching is the one where everyone is matched to their
first preference.
Another setting where there is a unique stable fractional matching is where all men having
identical preferences and all women have identical preferences. We shall call this setting the “pop-
ularity” setting. Here the only stable matching is where the ith most popular man is matched with
the ith most popular woman for all i ∈ [n]. This is because the most popular man and woman
must be matched as they are each other’s first preference. Given this, now the second most popular
man and woman become each other’s first preference as the most popular man and women are
now unavailable. In fact any combination of these two settings will have a unique stable fractional
matching.
Note that if any stable matching instance has MFP pairs, any stable matching must match them.
Based on this, we give the following polynomial-time algorithm which returns a matching which
must be a subset of any stable matching.
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Algorithm 1: CMFP matching
Input: I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉
Output: µ, I ′ = 〈M ′,W ′, U ′, V ′〉
t← 0;
µ← ∅;
M (0) ←M, W (0) ←W, U (0) ← U, V (0) ← V ;
I(0) = 〈M (0),W (0), U (0), V (0)〉;
while ∃(m,w) ∈M (t) ×W (t) s.t. w = argmaxa∈W U (t)(m, a), m = argmaxa∈M V (t)(a,w) do
µ← µ ∪ (m,w) ;
I(t+1) is I(t) with m and w removed;
t← t+ 1;
I ′ = I(t);
We use this algorithm to define a special class of stable matching instances called Conditioned
Mutual First Preference (CMFP).
Definition 6. We say that a stable matching instance I is in class CMFP if and only if Algorithm 1
returns a perfect matching when I is given as input.
Lemma 1. Given any stable matching instance I , Algorithm 1 returns a matching that is a subset
of any stable integral matching on I. Any stable fractional matching for instance I must set a weight
of 1 each pair contained in the matching returned by Algorithm 1.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Let us assume that this is not true. That is, there is a stable
matching instance I where µ is the matching returned by Algorithm 1 on I, and there is a stable
matching µ′ on I such that µ is not a subset of µ′. Let5 |µ| = k > 0. Let i1, · · · , ik and j1, · · · , jk such
that µ∗ = {(mi1 , wj1), · · · , (mik , wjk)} where (mit , wjt) are matched in the tth round in Algorithm
1.
Let t∗ ∈ [k] be the lowest index in [k] such that µ′(mit∗ , wjt∗ ) < 1. As µ′ is stable at least one
of mit∗ and wjt∗ must have higher utility for µ
′ than from matching integrally with each other.
Without loss of generality, let this be mit∗ . By construction of Algorithm 1, this is only possible
when µ′(mit∗ , wjt′ ) > 0 for some t
′ < t∗ . Thus, µ′(mit′ , wjt′ ) < 1. This is a contradiction as we
assumed t∗ to be the lowest index for which this happens.
Thus we have the result.
As a result, we have a polynomial-time algorithm to tell when instance is CMFP. Algorithm 1
helps us fix certain edges which must be included in any stable matching. Further, if the matching
returned is a perfect matching then it is the unique stable fractional matching for the given instance.
This is a consequence of Lemma 1. The class CMFP is also special in that incentive compatibility
can be achieved for this class.
Theorem 2. Given any matching instance belonging to CMFP, under any mechanism to find a
stable fractional matching, truthful revelation of preferences forms a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Given a stable matching instance I ∈ CMFP , every mechanism resulting in a stable frac-
tional matching will return the same matching µ∗. We use Algorithm 1 to give us labellings
5If µ = 0 then µ is the empty matching, and as a result is a subset of every matching on I.
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i1, · · · , in and j1, · · · , jn such that µ∗ = {(mi1 , wj1), · · · , (min , wjn)} where (mit , wjt) are matched
in the tth round in Algorithm 1.
Let all other agents be truthful. Clearly, (mi1 , wj1) have no incentive to misreport their prefer-
ences as they are already matched to their first preference. As long as mi1 and wj1 stay truthful,
they will continue to be matched to each other, irrespective of how other agents are behaving.
Now for t > 1 for (mit , wjt) neither can gain by increasing or decreasing their value for any agent
matched earlier. This is because the agents who are matched before round t are truthful and will
not become MFP pairs with mit or wjt . Thus, those pairings will not change. Of the remaining
agents, mit and wjt have highest value for each other and cannot benefit from misreporting their
preferences. Consequently, when all other agents are truthful, no agent has an incentive to misre-
port their preferences.
In fact, the same reasoning also shows that the stable matching in a CMFP instance is also
robust to coalitional manipulation.
Corollary 1. For each stable matching instance in CMFP , no coalition can collude to strategi-
cally misreport their preferences and improve their utilities under any mechanism to find a stable
fractional matching.
Consequently, when the matchings instances are restricted to those in CMFP , we have incen-
tive compatible mechanisms which result in stable fractional matchings. What we now show is that
in fact, this is the only set of instance where there is a unique stable fractional matching.
4.3 Matching Instances with Unique Stable Fractional Matchings
We shall now design a polynomial-time algorithm to find a stable fractional matching which is not
integral, whenever I /∈ CMFP . There is no algorithm (irrespective of the time complexity) to find
a stable fractional matching which is not integral in prior work. The various hurdles to this were
illustrated in Section 3.2. However, when the preferences are strict, we can use envy to help find
stable fractional matchings given a stable integral matching. The assumption of strict preferences
is very important to establish our results.
Note that by Lemma 1, the matching returned by Algorithm 1 must be a subset of any stable
matching. As a result, it suffices to have an algorithm which works on instances without MFP pairs.
We can first run Algorithm 1 and then use the aforementioned algorithm on the reduced instance
returned by Algorithm 1.
The key idea is that under strict preferences, when there are MFP pairs, then it is not possible
to reduce the weight on the edge between them and still be stable. However, whenever there are
no MFP pairs, each edge matched under a stable matching will have at least one node who prefers
another agent to their current partner. As a result, we can use envy-graphs to construct other
matchings which improve the utility of some of the agents. As the preferences are strict, there will
always exist a small enough weight to place on these matchings such that there are no blocking
pairs with other nodes. While it is not necessary to explicitly construct envy-graphs to help find
such matchings, envy-graphs help in expressing these ideas in an intuitive manner.
Cycles in Envy-Graphs
Let µ1 be a stable integral matching and assume GW (µ1) contains a cycle. We can produce an
alternate matching µ2 where all women not in C are matched as in µ1 and all women in C are
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matched to their successor’s6 partner under µ1.This resultant matching need not be stable, even
if the original was stable. However, it will increase the utility of the women in the cycle. Define
µα = αµ1 + (1− α)µ2, α ∈ [x, 1].
Let us now discuss the stability of µα. In this case, no woman sees a decrease in utility. As a
result, it suffices to ensure that no man experiences a large enough drop in utility for a blocking pair
to form. Let us first consider men whose partners are unchanged. They do not form any blocking
pairs. This is because any woman such a man prefers more to his current partner either has the
same or higher utility. Now, consider the men whose partners do change. Note that as µ1 is stable,
these men prefer their partners under µ1 over those under µ2. Let us define Wm(µ) = {w ∈ W :
V (m,w) > vw(µ)}. In order for µα, α ∈ [x, 1] to be stable we need that for each m ∈ M such that
µ1(m) 6= µ2(m), xum(µ1)+(1−x)um(µ2) ≥ maxw∈Wm(µ1) U(m,w). As we have strict preferences, a
value of x < 1 can be found in polynomial-time. Clearly a fractional matching can also analogously
be found when there is a cycle in GM (µ).
Acyclic Envy-Graphs
The approach of using envy-graphs can be extended when the given instance has no MFP pairs and
both envy-graphs are acyclic. Let µ1 be such a stable integral matching on an instance I which
has no MFP pairs. Consequently, at least one of GM (µ1) and GW (µ1) will be non-empty. Without
loss of generality, let this be GM (µ1). If this is acyclic, every path on the graph will have a sink.
Note that a node in an envy-graph is a sink if and only if the corresponding agent matched to their
first preference. Further, as there are no MFP pairs, the woman matched to this node under µ1
will have an outgoing edge in GW (µ1). The reason we are able to attain stability by resolving envy
along cycles is that all agents in the cycle get higher utility. When there is a path, the sink, let us
call this w, will be matched to the partner of the first node on the path, whom she clearly prefers
less. Further µ1(w) prefers w to her predecessor as µ1 is a stable matching. As a result, to ensure
stability, we need to increase the utility of µ1(w).
We resolve this as follows. Let the path found be P in GM (µ1) with source m and sink m′.
Define matching µ2 where each man not in P is matched as in µ1. m′ is matched to µ1(m). The
remaining nodes along P are matched to their successor’s partner under µ. As there are no MFP
pairs, we have that µ1(m′) has an outgoing edge in GW (µ1). Find a similar path to a sink, say w
in GW (µ1) and analogously define µ3. If µ(w) lies on P , then we are done. Else, we repeat the
same procedure for µ(w). We continue till the partner of the sink of the path considered lies on a
previous path considered. For each new path encountered, we define a new integral matching.
These matchings form the support of the stable fractional matching. To achieve stability, we
need to set weights on the matchings which ensure that the utility of each agent is greater than
their utility from the fractional matching from matching with agents who prefers them to their
current allocation. This is possible as the preferences are strict. As in the case of when cycles are
present, a linear program can be solved to find the weights on µ1 and all newly defined matchings
to find a stable fractional matching.
Before detailing the algorithm, we first set some notation. GM (µ) and GW (µ) are the envy-
graphs of men and women under µ as defined. For each m ∈ M α(m,µ) = 0 if Wm(µ) = ∅ else
α(m,µ) = maxw∈Wm(µ) U(m,w)). For each w ∈ W α(w, µ) = 0 if Mw(µ) = ∅ else α(w, µ) =
maxm∈Mw(µ) V (m,w)). For cycle C and node a ∈ C, succ(a,C) denotes a’s successor under C. For
path P and node a ∈ P , if a is the sink of the path, then succ(a, P ) denotes the source of the path,
6The successor of a node on a directed path or a cycle is the vertex to which it has an outgoing edge in the path/cycle.
There can only be one such vertex.
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Algorithm 2: Find a stable fractional matching
Input: I = 〈M,W,U, V 〉
Output: µ
(µs, I
′)← CMFP matching(I);
µ← µs;
if I ′ is non-empty then
k ← 1;
µ1 ← GaleShapley(I ′);
Generate Envy-Graphs GM (µ1) and GW (µ1);
if Either GM (µ1) or GW (µ1) contain a cycle C then
if ∃ cycle C ∈ GW (µ1) then
currSet←W ;
else
currSet←M ;
Find cycle C ∈ GM (µ1);
Define µ2 as follows;
if a ∈ currSet and a /∈ C then
µ2(a) = µ1(a);
µ2(µ1(a)) = a;
else
µ2(a) = µ1(succ(a,C));
µ2(µ1(succ(a,C))) = a;
else
A← ∅ \\ Set of agents whose utilities increase;
Find sink node w1 ∈ GW (µ1);
currNode← µ1(w1);
currSet←M ;
while currNode /∈ A do
k ← k + 1;
Find path P in GcurrSet(µ1);
Define µk as follows;
if a ∈ currSet and a /∈ P then
µk(a) = µ1(a);
µk(µ1(a)) = a;
else
µk(a) = µ1(succ(a, P ));
µk(µ1(succ(a, P ))) = a;
if a 6= sink(P ) then
A← A ∪ {a};
currNode← sink(P );
if currSet =M then
currSet←W ;
else
currSet←M ;
Find x1, · · ·xk such that
∑k
i=1 xi = 1 and
∀m ∈M ,∑ki=1 xiU(m,µi(m)) ≥ maxi∈[k] α(m,µi) and
∀w ∈W ,∑ki=1 xiV (µi(w), w) ≥ maxi∈[k] α(w, µi);
µ← µs ∪
∑k
i=1 xiµi;
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else succ(a, P ) denotes a’s successor under P .
Time Complexity of Algorithm 2: A cycle or a path in an envy-graph can always be found
in polynomial-time. Thus, computing a new matching can be done in polynomial-time. As each
matching is defined to improve the utility of a previously unimproved agent, there can be at most
2n matchings. Further, the required xi values can be found by solving a linear program with the
appropriate constraints. The number of variables are k, which is the number of matchings. Thus,
this linear program can be solved efficiently. Consequently, the algorithm detailed is a polynomial-
time algorithm. It finds a stable fractional matching which is not integral whenever one exists.
Theorem 3. A stable matching instance I has a unique stable fractional matching if and only if it
is in CMFP.
Proof. Let I be stable matchings instance. We have already established that if I ∈ CMFP , I
has a unique stable fractional matching. We now prove the other direction by establishing the
contrapositive. Let I /∈ CMFP , and µs and I ′ be the matching and instance returned by Algorithm
1 on I. Clearly, µs is not a perfect matching. Any matching µ on I ′ which is stable, can be combined
with µs to obtain a stable matching for I.
Let µ1 be the stable matching returned by Gale Shapley on I ′ with men proposing. Note that, as
I ′ is the instance returned by Algorithm 1, there is are no MFP pairs. Consequently, at least one of
GM (µ1) and GW (µ1) will be non-empty. Algorithm 2 will give a stable fractional matching which
is not integral.
A simple corollary of Theorem 3 is that under strict preferences, a stable matching instance has
either a unique stable fractional matching, or uncountably many.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper looks into the design of incentive compatible mechanisms for finding stable fractional
matchings. We first showed that this is not possible under general settings. We then discovered a
class of stable matchings instances which have a unique stable fractional matching, namely those
satisfying the Conditioned Mutual First Preference (CMFP ) property. We showed that every mech-
anism that finds a stable fractional matching is incentive compatible if and only if the input in-
stances are in CMFP . We presented the first algorithm to compute stable fractional matchings
which are not integral. The algorithm makes intelligent use of envy-graphs, hitherto unused in the
stable matchings literature.
Our work suggests several interesting directions of future work. Firstly, the hardness of finding
an optimal manipulation for our algorithm is not clear. Another relevant direction of future work
would be to find algorithms to find stable fractional matchings and are hard to manipulate. Another
possibility would be investigating if it is possible to achieve incentive compatibility by relaxing the
stability constraint. Envy-graphs are an essential tool for the analysis done in this paper. An
interesting problem is whether the use of envy-graphs can give better approximation algorithms for
finding social welfare maximizing stable fractional matchings. Finally, it would be important to see
if the same results hold without strict preferences.
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